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SOFTWARE PUBLISHING AND
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COPYING
Harry C. Benham
Division of Economics
University of Oklahoma
Jennifer L. Wagner
Department of Management
Roosevelt University

ABSTRACT
Recent
Unauthorized duplication of microcomputer software is apparently commonplace.
decisions by major software publishers to drop "copy protection" may well result in even more
unauthorized duplication. This paper addresses the impact of unauthorized software duplication

on software publishers' profits.

Software "clubs" of the type suggested by Buchanan (1965)

are posited as providing a mechanism whereby software publishers can indirectly appropriate
revenue for unauthorized software copies. It is shown that, under certain conditions, software
publishers' profits may actually increase when users can make unauthorized copies.
Recent growth in microcomputer sales has brought

Since unauthorized copying of software is perceived

with it growth in the demand for microcomputer

as a problem, there are also articles listing avenues

software. Coincident with this growth has been an
increased incidence of unauthorized duplication of
microcomputer software.
Software publishers

of legal "protection" available to software publishers
(Price and Jones 1986) and articles discussing "copy
protection" mechanisms which can be incorporated
into the original software product (Small 1985).

responded to unauthorized duplication of their
products with various forms of "copy protection."
Even with "copy protection devices," the claim has
been made that on the order of 50 percent of all
microcomputer software currently in use is pirated
(DiNacci 1986, p. 126). In 1986, major software

Microcomputer software is often thought of as a
creative work worthy of protection under copyright
laws. But surprisingly, there has been little specific

publishers began removing "copy protection" from

unauthorized copying of software or the impact of

their products.

treatment of the

economic

issues

concerning

This paper examines the economic

software copying on the market for software

effects of copying
microcomputer software on
software publisher revenues.
Currently such
copying is unauthorized and illegal. The focus of

Within the economics literature,
products.
unauthorized duplication of microcomputer software
falls within the purview of the considerable

this paper is on whether it might be in the best
interest of the software publisher to authorize (at

literature on optimal patents.

least implicitly) such copying.

Citly refer to unauthorized copying of software.

Recent papers by

Novos and Waldman (1984) and Johnson (1985) expliHowever, the assumptions employed by these authors

The popular press has treated unauthorized
duplication of microcomputer software as an evil
directly analogous to theft.
Consequently, some
articles admonish employers to prevent unauthorized
copying by their employees (Cooper and Somervill
1985) and others describe how unauthorized copying

injures the software publisher (Sacks 1985).

It is

-- that unauthorized copies are equivalent to
originals, that the marginal costs of unauthorized
copies vary across individuals, and that the marginal
cost of an unauthorized copy exceeds the marginal

cost of producing an original -- greatly limit their
application to unauthorized duplication of microcomputer software.
In the case of unauthorized

the

copies of software, the "quality" of the copy is

publisher's revenue and hence his incentive to

often below that of the original, particularly if one

develop and bring to market new software products.

includes documentation and publisher support of the

claimed

that

unauthorized

copying

reduces
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Let each individual's
Further, let
valuation of the product be ui.

product as part of an original software product.

consumption of a copy.

Software which can be used to create unauthorized
copies is widely available. Thus the marginal cost
of an unauthorized copy should not vary substantially across individuals. Finally, the cost of an

individuals differ in their valuations of the product
by having ui distributed over the interval [O,U]

according to a density g(.) that is continuously

unauthorized copy may be as low as the cost of a

differentiable and nonzero in the specified interval.

diskette, well below the producer's marginal cost

If the software product sells for a price of P, an
individual's net benefit from the purchase of the
product would be ui - P. If obtaining an unautho-

which includes documentation and product support.
This paper suggests that unauthorized copying of
software need not adversely impact publishers'
revenues. Following Liebowitz (1985), a mechanism
is suggested which allows a software publisher to
indirectly appropriate revenue from unauthorized

copies. Thus unauthorized duplication of software
may not reduce incentives to develop new software
products.

rized copy is impossible, those individuals with

positive net benefits from the purchase of the
product will purchase the software product.
Consider

the

publisher's

pricing

decision

when

unauthorized copying is effectively prevented. The
publisher's problem is to select tlie price, Pn. which
maximizes profits or

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.

U

Section I presents a model of a software publisher's
pricing decision when copying is possible. Section
II discusses some implications of this model,
including the possibility of publishers indirectly
appropriating revenue from unauthorized copies.

A necessary condition for the maximization of

Section III illustrates the essential features of the

equation (2) is

A -

Max

(P-m)g(x)dx - F.

p

(2)

P

model with numerical examples. Section IV provides

some testable hypotheses based on the model.
Finally, Section V contains concluding remarks and
suggestions for future research.

I. THE MODEL

di

dp

U
r

= j

g(x)dx - (P-m)g(P) - 0.

This condition can be rearranged to yield the

The market for a particular software product is
considered.
The software publisher's product is

assumed to be an imperfect substitute for other

traditional "marginal cost equal to marginal revenue"
condition,

software products. The effect of this assumption is
that the software publisher faces a downward
sloping demand for his product.

(3)

p

U

Equation (1)

mg(P) - Pg(P) -

describes the publisher's total costs of producing x

P

g(x)dx

(3a)

units of the product

where the first term on the right hand side is the
TC(x) -F+m x

(1)

where F denotes the fixed costs of developing the
software product and mx denotes the variable costs

of production and sate of x units of the product.

additional revenue from sales to individuals with
valuation P and the second term is the revenue lost

as a result of lowering the price to P.

Further

manipulation of equation (3) yields a profit maximizing price of

For a microcomputer software product, the cost of

an additional unit, m, would include the cost of
duplicating a diskette, printing the documentation,
and providing some expected amount of support to
the purchaser.

U

p
Pn=m+

Individuals may derive utility from the consumption

of one unit of the software product or from the

g(x)dx
n
3(Pn)
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(4)

where the price is equal to the variable cost plus a

margin comprised of the ratio of total sales to
marginal sales.
Consider now the prospects of individuals obtaining

unauthorized copies of the software product.

a)
b)
c)
d)

0 < 6(n) < 1 for n > 1,
6(n) > 6(n+1),
c(n,P) s P,
there exists n' such that 6(n) - 6(n+1) >
c(n,P) - c(n+1,P) for all n > n:

How

is an original located for the purpose of making an
unauthorized copy? What are the incentives for the

Assumption a) states formally that the club's copies

owner of an original to allow copying? A software

Assumption b)
are inferior to the original.
indicates that the "quality" declines as club size

club in the sense of Buchanan (1965) is proposed to

increases. The reasoning behind this assumption is

answer these questions. In such a club, a number

that the "quality" reduction is related to the

of individuals come together to purchase one
original and make copies for the remaining club

availability, quality, or access to documentation and

members. For instance, a club could consist of
three friends or business associates who arrange to
have one purchase a word processor, one purchase a
spreadsheet, and one purchase a database manage-

each member is from the documentation and

ment

members of unauthorized copies does not exceed the

program

and

then

share

their

programs.

publisher support.

The larger the club, the further

publisher support.
Assumption

c) indicates

that

the

cost

to

club

Alternatively, a "club" need not be so formal;

purchase price of an original.

owners

their

were violated, joining a club would always be less

software holdings, and agree to swap. Participants
are willing to allow their software to be copied in

desirable than purchasing an original and there

of software

could

meet,

discuss

If this assumption

would be no unauthorized copying.

exchange for receiving a copy of some other
software. Other examples of clubs could include
family members or workers in a particular depart-

The final assumption, assumption d), is critical. It

ment or office - situations where one purchased

"quality" of the copied software exceeds the cost

copy is used by more than one individual.

What is the value or utility of an unauthorized copy

This
savings from additional club members.
condition will be met provided that quality deteriorates sufficiently fast while cost savings decrease at

to a club member?

a decreasing rate.

In this paper, it is argued that

indicates that at some point the decline in the

Those who have attempted to

the "Quality" of an unauthorized copy is less than

read a photocopy of a software manual which

the "quality" of the original. Although the software
code may be an exact duplicate of the original, the
user of an unauthorized copy will not have access

heavily uses color would acknowledge that quality

to equivalent documentation or support from the
publisher. Often only the software code is copied,
leaving the unauthorized user with no documentation.
Sometimes the manual is also copied.
However, a photocopy of the manual may be

illegible in places, be missing pages, and is in a less
convenient package.
Let the net benefit of
participating in a software club of size n be given
by

6(n)ui - c(n,P).

In the above expression, the 6(n) term captures the
reduced quality of unauthorized copies and c(n,P) is

can decline rapidly. The behavior of costs as club
Normally, one
size increases can be predicted.
would expect that the cost of an unauthorized copy
would decline with club size. Indeed, if copies can
be made at a cost of c and club members share
equally the purchase of the original, then c(n,P) = c
+ P/n declines in n where P is the cost of an
original and n is the number of club members.
However, software clubs are engaged in illegal

activities.

If the club's activities are detected and

the club members prosecuted, the penalty could be
substantial. Thus c(n,P) should perhaps contain an

expected penalty term. Surely larger software clubs
are more likely to be detected than small clubs.
Thus c(n,P) could increase with club size for larger
values of n. With quality deterioration and the
probable behavior of c(n,P) discussed here, assumption d) seems reasonable.

the effective cost of the unauthorized copies to
members of a club of size n. The following specific
assumptions are made:
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Within this context, an individual will purchase an

original (join a club of size one) if

ui -P>0 and

The points at which individuals switch to a club of

(5a)

(5b)

size n, U(n), can be determined from conditions (5)
through (8).
The valuation level at which individuals switch to clubs of size one (purchase

Condition (5a) indicates that the individual's net

originals), U(1), follows from condition (5b) and is

ui -P> 6(n)ui - c(n,P) for all n22.

benefit from the purchase of an original is positive.
Condition (5b) indicates that this same net benefit
exceeds the net benefit that would result from

given by

-

joining a club of any size.

Max
U(1) -

1

An individual will join a software club of size n if
the net benefit from doing so is positive and
exceeds the net benefit of either joining clubs of

Individuals with valuations ui where

other sizes or purchasing the product. Formally, an
individual will join a club of size n if

U(n) < ui < U(n-1) and ul > U(P)

6(n)ui- c(n,P) > 0,

(6)

6(n)ui - c(n.P) > ui - P,

(7)

(9)

[ P - c(n,P) ]

n

1-6(n)

-

-

will join clubs of size n. The switch point U(n)
derived from condition (8a) is given by

c(n+1,P) - c(n,P)
6(n)uk - c(n,P) > 6(n+1)ui - c(n+1.P), and

(8a)

U(n)

(10)

=

6(n+1) - 6(n)
6(n)u - c(n,P) > 6(n-1)ui - c(n-1,P).

(8b)
Finally, the lowest valuation level to yield a non-

negative net benefit, U(P), is obtained as

Condition (6) indicates that the net benefit from

joining a club of size n is positive. Condition (7)
indicates that the net benefit from joining a club of

size n i s greater than the net benefit from
purchasing an original.

Min

U(P) -n{u i l 6(n)ui - c(n,P) -0 }(11)

Finally, conditions (8a) and

(8b) indicate that the net benefit of belonging to a

It can be shown that U(n) < U(n- 1).1

club of size n dominates the net benefit of
belonging to clubs of any other size.

When copying occurs, the publisher does not sell

Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between an

one unit of the product for each individual using
Rather, the publisher sells one
the product.
original to each club. Equations (9), (10), and (11)

individual's valuation of the software product, ui,
and club membership. Net benefit schedules are
drawn for purchasers of originals (clubs of size
one), clubs of size two, and clubs of size three.

can be used to define n(u,P), the size of club which

an individual with valuation u would join if the
software product were sold at a price of P. The
density, g(u), indicates the number of individuals
with valuation leveI u. If those individuals are

Individuals whose valuation of the product exceeds

U(1) purchase the software since the net benefit
from purchasing the software exceeds the net
benefit of all other alternatives. Individuals whose

members of a software club of size n(u,P), then

valuation of the product falls between U(2) and
U(1) join clubs of size two since it is in this range
that the net benefit of belonging to a club of size
two exceeds that of all alternatives. Similarly,
individuals whose valuations of the product falls
between U(P) and U(2) join clubs of size three.

given by g(u)/n(u,P). In the presence of clubs, the

sales to individuals with evaluation level u would be

publisher's market contains
valuations as low as U(P).

individuals

with

The publisher's problem in an environment where
software copying clubs may exist is to select a
price, P*, which maximizes the publisher's profits or

Finally, individuals whose valuations of the product

are below U(P) neither purchase nor copy the
product since neither activity would yield a positive

U

net benefit.
The relationship between product
valuation and club size illustrated in Figure 1
becomes an important feature of this model.

Max

X .. P
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g(x)
dx
(P-m)
n(x,P)
U(P)

-

F

(12)

Net
Benefit

Club Size 1
Club Size 2

Club Size 3
0

i

1
1

-P

1

0

1
1
U(2)

U(P)

U(1)

U

Individual
Valuation

Figure 1.
where U(P) < P is the lowest valuation level for
which a club of any size yields a positive net
benefit.
A necessary condition for maximizing
equation (12), assuming an internal solution, is

where the marginal revenue on the right hand side
is comprised of two terms: additional revenue from
sales generated by lowering the price and revenue

(13)

way in which the quantity sold responds to a

f

d,r

change in price.
g(X)

U(P)n(x,P)

First there are sales to clubs of

size n,

g(U(P))

dx-(P-m)
dP

lost on previous sales due to the price reduction.
The interesting new feature of equation (13a) is the

U'= 0
n(U(P),P)

g(U(P))

n(U(P),P)
Like equation (3), equation (13) can be arranged in

the traditional "marginal cost equals marginal
revenue" form,

Second, there is the U' term indicating how the

valuation level at which clubs form responds to a

change in price. Further manipulation of equation
(13) results in a profit maximizing price of

(13a)
r
m L

P

g(U(p))

1

n(U(P),P)

1

U'-

r g(u(p

L

7

iu -f
U(P)
n(U(P),P) J

U

g(X)
dx

g(X)

U(P*)n(x,P*)
dx

P

n(x,P)

=m+

(14)

[g(U(P*)) / n(U(P*),P*)] U'
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Notice that since clubs purchase the software
product, the lower limit of integration, U(P*), is
As
the valuation at which clubs cease to form.

was the case in equation (4), the profit maximizing
price is the marginal cost plus a margin comprised
of the ratio of total sales to marginal sales.

The potential for a publisher to indirectly appropriate revenue by exploiting club-induced
segmentation of the market is depicted in panel b).

The highest price shown on the vertical axis, Pl, is
the price charged by the publisher. At this price,
Qi originals are sold to individual users. Assuming

the copies are made at a zero cost (c=0), (Q,-

in which a publisher sells a software product in an

Qi)/2 originals
size two. The
club members
effective price

environment where software clubs exist. The first
is that, although software clubs exist to make
unauthorized copies of the software, they also

lisher's profit is represented by the sum of the
areas of the stair-stepped shaded rectangles in

II. DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL

There are two interesting features of the situation

are sold at a price of Pi to clubs of
effective price paid by the Q - Qi
is thus PI = Pl/2. Similarly, the
to members of clubs of size three is
Ps = Pi/3 with Q3 - Q: users. Thus the pub-

generate sales, sales which might not have occurred

panel b).

if copying were effectively prevented. The second
feature is the sorting or "self-selection" of software

The kernel of this paper is that the shaded area in

users into clubs of different sizes according to their
valuations of the product. Such segmentation of a

panel b) may exceed the shaded area in panel a).
With software clubs. the possibility exists for the

market can generally be used by the seller to

publisher to gain the increased revenue associated
Further,
with effective price discrimination.

increase revenues through price discrimination. In
this case, the segmentation provides a mechanism
through which the publisher can indirectly

software users implement the price discrimination by
self-selecting themselves into clubs of various sizes.

appropriate revenue from the unauthorized copies.

III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Figure 2 illustrates the relevant alternatives. Panel
a) depicts the situation with no unauthorized

copying. The publisher's downward sloping demand

Numerical examples will illustrate the phenomenon
of unauthorized copying allowing the publisher to

curve is given by D. The maximum profit resulting
from the equation of marginal costs (MC) and
marginal revenues (MR) is represented by the

above model: the publisher's pricing decision and

shaded area.

The software is sold at a price of P

increase profits. The attraction of these examples
is that they emphasize the two major factors in the

the effect of "quality" deterioration of unauthorized
copies.

and the quantity sold is Q.

b

a

Price

Price

p 1 13-0.00,
P

-

P2 &2--''- '

MC
AMR

#\D

'

i#D

1

0

Quantity

Q1

Figure 2.
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Q23
Q

Quantity

Values for the model's "parameters" are required for
these examples. The publisher's fixed cost, F, does
not affect the pricing decision or the quantity sold;
it affects only profits. A value of 500 is used for
F.
The publisher's marginal costs consist of

reproducing the program disks, printing the
documentation, distributing the product, and
providing some user support.
parameter, m, is set to

The marginal cost

10 as a reference value.

Club copying costs are assumed to be given by
c(n,P) =c+ P/n, where three different values of c,

the cost of an unauthorized copy, are used to
illustrate the effect of copying costs on the extent
of copying and the publisher's revenue.

For

reference, Table 1 contains the values of these
"parameters." To be concrete, these values may be
considered as dollar amounts.

The density function, g(.), sets both the size of the
market and the distribution of individual valuations
within the market. For convenience, the size of
the market is set to 100.

Since the distribution of

valuations within the market affects the publisher's

pricing decision and unauthorized copying, two
market distributions are considered. The first is a
uniform distribution with

The second distribution is triangular with

g(x) -

<4 0- .0 4 x, 50< X=51%0}

With this distribution, the easy correspondence
between valuation and quantity sold is lost.
However, a symmetric, unimodal distribution may
more accurately reflect "real world" valuations.
When unauthorized copies cannot be made, these
parameter values are sufficient for determining the

publisher's price, quantity sold, and profits. For
the uniform distribution, solution of equation (4)
yields a profit maximizing price of 55, quantity sold

of 45 units, and total revenue of 2475, resulting in
profits of 1525. For the triangular distribution,
solution of equation (4) yields a profit maximizing
price of 44.29, quantity sold of 61 units, and total
revenue of 2702, resulting in profits of 1583.

In order to determine the outcome when it is
possible to make unauthorized copies, values of 6(n)

must be established. The first set of values for
6(n) was chosen to illustrate a situation where
copying initially has little impact on the quality of
the software product. Given the 6(n) values in
Table 2, no one would purchase an original and the

g(x)-1, O s x s 100.

majority of sales would go to clubs of size two. If

c=0, the publisher's profits are maximized by
Specifying a uniform distribution for g(.) on the
interval [0,100] provides easy translation between

charging a price of 100 rather than the no-copying

valuation levels and the quantity sold. For example,
if individuals with valuations in excess of 75

price of 55.
In this case, copying has clearly
reduced sales (23.64 units rather than 45), but
profits have increased from 1525 to 1627.60. When

purchase the product, then 100 - 75 or 25 units

c= 1 or c=2, unauthorized copying is reduced, yet

would be sold.

profits remain above their no-copying level.

Table 1. Parameter Values

Parameter

Value

F

500

m

10

c

0,1,2

Meaning
Publisher Fixed Cost
Publisher Variable Cost

Cost of Unauthorized Copy
(exclusive of purchasing
the original)
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Table 2. Uniform Distribution

C=1, P=99.00

C=0, P=100.00

C=2, P=98.00

Club

Revenue

Q-Sold

Revenue

Q-Sold

Revenue

Size

6(n)

Q-Sold

1

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

.95

22.22

2222.00

22.50

2227.50

22.78

2232.44

3

.65

1.42

142.00

.90

89.10

0.37

36.26

4

.40

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

23.64

2634.00

23.40

2316.60

23.15

2268.70

Totals
Profits

1537.20

1582.60

1627.60

The triangular distribution yields results comparable

to those shown in Table 2. Table 3 uses the same
values of 6(n) as Table 2. In Table 3 the majority

of sales are to clubs of size two.

For all three
values of c, the publisher's price is substantially
above the no-copying price of 44.29 and the
resulting profits are greater than the no-copying
profits of 1583. Thus the self-selective behavior of

club members allows the publisher to effectively
acquire revenue for unauthorized copies.

Tables 4 and 5 utilize a second set of values for

6(n). These values illustrate a situation where
copying greatly reduces the quality of the software
product. Table 4 presents the publisher's maximum
profit under the different values for c assuming a

uniform distribution. When copying has such an
adverse impact on product quality, sales to
individuals are reduced only slightly from the 45
units which would have occurred if copying were
earned on
not possible. Additional revenues are

Table 3. Triangular Distribution

C=0, P=81.50

C=1, P=79.50

C=2, P=78.00

Club

Size

Revenue

Q-Sold

Revenue

Q-Sold

Revenue

6(n>

Q-Sold

1

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

.95

29.50

2404.25

30.49

2423.95

31.22

2435.16

3

.65

2.02

164.63

1.07

85.06

0.15

11.70

4

.40

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

31.52

2568.88

31.56

2509.01

31.37

2446.86

Totals
Profits

1693.40

1753.75
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1633.16

Table 4. Uniform Distribution

C=1, P=57.50

C=0, P=58.00

C=2, P=57.50

Club

Size

6(n)

Q-Sold

Revenue

Q-Sold

Revenue

Q-Sold

Revenue

1

1.00

42.00

2436.00

42.50

2443.75

42.50

2443.75

2

.50

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

3

.40

3.22

186.76

2.36

135.70

1.53

87.97

4

.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

45.22

2622.89

44.68

2579.45

44.03

2531.72

Totals
Profits

1670.56

1630.85

IV. TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS

club sales so that, in every instance, the publisher's
profit exceeds the no-copying level of 1525.

1591.42

Table

5 displays similar results for the triangular

A number of the assumptions employed in developing

distribution.

the model presented above are potentially testable
as are the model's implications. That the quality of
software declines when unauthorized copies are
made is testable. Further, the amount of quality

Thus increased publisher profits can

be obtained for a variety of values of 6(n),
underlying distributions, and copying costs when
copying is possible.

Table 5. Triangular Distribution

C=0, P=47.00

C=1, P=46.00

C=2, P=45.50

Club

Size

6(n)

Q-Sold

Revenue

Q-Sold

Revenue

Q-Sold

Revenue

1

1.00

55.82

2623.54

57.68

2653.28

58.60

2666.30

2

.50

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

3

.40

4.50

211.50

2.99

137.54

1.52

69.16

4

.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

60.32

2835.04

60.67

2790.82

60.12

2735.46

Totals
Profits

1731.84

1684.12
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1634.26

deterioration may depend upon characteristics of the
software product. For example, an unauthorized
copy of a product which is menu-driven with
extensive on-line "Help" facilities may suffer little

removed its hardware lock and raised its price
approximately 30 percent.

quality decline. Alternatively, an unauthorized copy
of a product which is command-driven with a

software publishers' profits may be increased by
copying. The use of multivariate techniques may
detect a positive correlation between profits and
the extent to which the software has been copied,
The
taking suitable covariates into account.
and
documentation
third-party
availability of
instruction manuals could serve as a proxy for the
unobserved copying activity.

complex set-up procedure employing specialized
device drivers may suffer considerable quality
decline.

A second testable implication concerns club sizes.
In the model, software club sizes were self-limiting.
Although members of software clubs may be

reluctant to provide information on their activities
for fear of prosecution, specialized survey research

techniques may be able to elicit appropriate data.
The key empirical issue is that the clubs be small.

A final testable implication of the model is that

V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The model and the numerical examples suggest that
unauthorized copying of microcomputer software
does not necessarily impact adversely upon the

In the numerical examples, publishers were able to

revenue or profits of software publishers.

indirectly appropriate revenue from unauthorized

adjusting prices to reflect unauthorized copying by

copies by increasing the price of the original.
Comparison of "copy protected" and "unprotected"
software prices should confirm that prices increase

By

users, it may actually be possible for publishers to
achieve higher profits.

when copying is possible. On this point there is
some anecdotal evidence. One interesting phenomenon has been the release of both "copy protected"

The

and "unprotected" versions of the same software

The testable implications set forth in the previous

product. In every instance, the "unprotected"
version commands a substantial price premium. One
popular word processor, for example, is available
with "copy protection" for $75 while the "unprotected" version sells for between $200 and $250.
Another example is provided by a memory-resident
program
available in "copy protected" and
"unprotected" versions. The publisher reports that

section are obvious candidates for further research.

the more expensive "unprotected" version has
outsold the "copy protected" version by a factor of

zation of necessary conditions under which copying
increases publisher profits.

protection" schemes may detract from the product
and account for some of the price differential, one
could also attribute the price differential t0

ENDNOTES

whether or not more than one individual is likely to
use the product.

themselves into clubs whose members have similar
preferences.

Another piece of anecdotal evidence is the lack of

2 This assumption is not necessary. It serves only
Similar results are
to simplify the diagram.
obtained with c > 0.

five to one (Carroll 1986. p. 37).

While "copy

market success of software using a hardware "lock."
Hardware "locks," physical devices which must be

arguments

presented

in

this

paper should

generate further investigation of the effects of
unauthorized duplication of microcomputer software.

In addition, several other topics are deserving of
attention. Additional understanding of the nature,
causes, and consequences of quality deterioration is
needed. Estimates of "real world" product valuation
distributions, publisher marginal costs, and the costs
of unauthorized copying are required. Finally, it
would be desirable to develop a general characteri-

1 Berglas (1976) has also shown that individuals sort

present in or on the microcomputer in order to use
the software, have existed for a number years. The
few software products which utilize these devices
are largely unknown despite their functionality and

their having preceded now popular products in the
market. One such "locked" product has recently
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